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AbstractThe area of security for Heterogeneous Sensor
Networks (HSNs) is still an open research eld that requires new
cryptographic solutions. Recent results have demonstrated that
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Pairing-Based Cryptog-
raphy (PBC) are computationally feasible on sensor devices. This
allows a wide range of novel security mechanisms, like Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE), to be considered for Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs).
In this paper we present an efcient security bootstrapping
mechanism for HSNs that uses IBE and exploits the enhanced
capabilities of high-end cluster heads. Our asymmetric security
scheme provides authenticated key distribution without using
expensive certicates. It also achieves signicant savings in
communication overhead and in the number of keys stored
on sensor devices. We also present TinyIBE, which is to our
knowledge, the rst implementation of a complete identity-
based encryption scheme for sensor networks. Our evaluation
results and comparison with the state of the art show that
TinyIBE is a superior security scheme for HSNs which provides
affordable public key cryptography without requiring hardware
acceleration. With this work we prove that ID-based encryption
is not only possible on sensor nodes but is an attractive security
solution in this application space.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks have gained much attention over
the last few years. They allow us to gather precise information
about the surrounding environment and sense data from pre-
viously inaccessible areas. One of the biggest advantages of
sensor networks is their versatility - many conguration modes
and various types of sensors that make them suitable for a wide
range of applications. This versatility presents challenges when
it comes to network protocol design for WSNs. A solution
designed specially for a at network topology is unlikely to
be the right choice in a clustered network scenario. Optimal
solutions should be tailored to a specic network organisation
and this holds true also in case of security protocols.
The security of wireless sensor networks has been the
subject of extensive studies in recent years. Most of the work
in this area was focused on at and homogeneous networks
where all sensor nodes have the same capabilities in terms
of memory storage, CPU power, transceiver speed and energy
supply. In such networks all nodes perform similar tasks such
as sensing, routing and data processing. However, theoretical
calculations and experimental results [1] have shown that
homogeneous networks have lower performance and scalabil-
ity than heterogeneous networks. They are also less energy
efcient and suffer from high communication and storage
overheads [1]. Recently deployed sensor networks are starting
to follow heterogeneous design [2].
A heterogeneous sensor network is a hierarchical WSN that
is typically organised into clusters that consists of two types of
nodes. More powerful devices (H-sensors) usually take the role
of Cluster Heads (CHs) and low-end nodes (L-sensors) become
ordinary cluster members. L-sensors are mainly responsible
for sensing whereas H-sensors perform additional tasks such
as data collection, information processing and reporting to the
Base Station (BS). The role of CH is xed in this kind of a
network. The dominating trafc pattern in HSNs is many-to-
one, where L-sensors send data to their CHs.
Many existing key distribution schemes for WSNs are
designed to set up pairwise keys among nodes without con-
sidering the actual communication pattern (e.g. [3]). The
L-sensors communicate with only a small number of their
neighbours and they do not need to maintain shared keys
with all of them. Based on this observation we propose a
new security bootstrapping mechanism that takes advantage
of the processing capabilities of H-sensors. It uses ID-based
encryption and requires small number of keys in the network.
Our implementation results show that by using efcient public
key techniques we can simplify the key distribution process,
signicantly reduce the communication overhead and lower
the energy consumption to prolong the network lifetime.
II. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The main security goals for HSNs include data privacy,
integrity and freshness, availability, access control, information
and entity authentication. The rst goal can be fullled by
incorporating a link layer security mechanism (e.g. TinySec
[4]). Access control should allow only legitimate nodes to join
clusters and become CHs. Guaranteeing availability involves
minimising the impact of DoS attacks. Authentication ensures
the receiver that the message did in fact originate from the
claimed sender. In many cases the condentiality of simple
sensor readings is not as important as the origin of the data.
All of the above security requirements can be fully ad-
dressed only by building upon a solid key distribution frame-
work. Key management is an essential cryptographic mech-
anism upon which other security primitives are built. The
main focus of this paper is to design a solid and scalable key
distribution scheme for HSNs that solves the shortcomings of
existing solutions.
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A. Possible attacks
Like any wireless networks HSNs are vulnerable to differ-
ent kinds of attacks including jamming, eavesdropping and
spoong. There are also additional attacks that are exclusive
to sensor networks. Deployments in public areas introduce a
risk of a physical attack and limited battery power opens the
door for a whole range of DoS attacks resulting in a node's
energy depletion. HSNs that use node identities are also prone
to replication and Sybil [5] attacks.
Perhaps the biggest problem in this kind of networks is the
node capture attack. L-sensors are typically low-cost devices
that do not have secure storage for cryptographic keys or
tamper-proof hardware. An active attacker may easily subvert
a node, intercept messages and decode them using the derived
secret key. Recent results show that standard sensor nodes,
such as MICA2 can be compromised in less than one minute
[6]. Capture attacks involving CHs are particulary damaging
in HSNs, because these nodes are responsible for critical
functions such as data processing and routing. H-sensors store
more cryptographic keys and they are the primary target for
possible attackers. Should an adversary manage to become a
CH, it gains access to valuable information and can stage a
number of different insider attacks targeting nodes within the
cluster and across the network. Insider attacks are a lot harder
to prevent and detect because they are performed by nodes
that are regarded as legitimate members of the network. Active
attacks like sinkhole, selective forwarding and false message
injection can be especially dangerous and may even lead to
complete network failure.
III. RELATED WORK
Key management in sensor networks has been an active
research topic in recent years. Many authors proposed random
key pre-distribution schemes [3], [7]. These approaches are
promising for small size networks but they do not scale well
as they require that each node is pre-loaded with a large
number of keys. Most of the key pre-distribution schemes
were designed for homogeneous sensor networks and once
applied in HSNs they suffer from high communication and
storage overhead. Du et. al [8] tried to address these issues by
proposing an asymmetric key pre-distribution scheme that uses
the capabilities of H-sensors. The authors of [9] and [10] also
tried to adopt key pre-distribution schemes to t heterogenous
network design. However, all these solutions are based on
symmetric key techniques and they do not provide a perfect
trade-off between resilience and storage.
Compared with symmetric key cryptography, Public Key
Cryptography (PKC) provides a more exible and simple
interface, without the need for key pre-distribution, pair-wise
key sharing or complicated one-way key chain schemes. Gura
et al. [11] demonstrated that ECC is computationally feasible
in WSNs. Furthermore Hu et al. [12] showed that even RSA
is possible on sensor nodes under the condition that we use a
dedicated hardware accelerator for cryptographic operations.
Despite the fact that public key primitives are computation-
ally feasible on sensor nodes, protocols based on them are
not. They require exchange and storage of large keys, which is
especially expensive for L-sensors. Most PKC schemes needs
also authentication of public keys which is usually performed
by expensive certicates and digital signatures.
Recent papers [13], [14] have demonstrated fast and efcient
implementations of PBC primitives on a range of WSN
platforms. This fact enables practical implementations of IBE
schemes and thus opens new ways for achieving security in
sensor networks. The authors in [15], [16], [17] envisioned the
use of IBE as a security solution for WSNs. All three papers
proposed the Boneh and Franklin IBE scheme [18]. However
the feasibility of such solution for practical applications was
not tested. None of the works have implemented a complete
IBE scheme on sensor devices.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Our scheme is a PKC based algorithm and is much more
computationally expensive than standard symmetric key algo-
rithms. However we only use it as a bootstrapping mechanism
to distribute pair-wise keys after network deployment.
A. Preliminaries
In our model of HSN we assume that the network will
consist of a large number of L-sensors and only a small
number of H-sensors. Nodes are static and they do not move
after deployment. L-sensors are cheap devices that do not have
tamper-proof hardware. It is possible for an active attacker
to compromise any L-sensor and extract all its secrets. The
CHs store valuable data and keying material, which makes
them especially attractive for attackers. We cannot assume
that every H-sensor will be tamper-resistant, as this would
be too expensive in most deployments. The best that we can
hope for is that H-sensors will incorporate a cost effective
memory protection mechanism which deletes all the secrets
once it detects on chip debugging (as proposed in [6]). Our
model assumes also that the environment is insecure from
the beginning and the attacks are possible right after network
deployment (as oppose to [9]).
The base station does not have to be connected to the
network at all times. It can be mobile and we assume that
it is well protected from physical attacks. In our scheme the
base station can establish a secure connection with any node
in the network using its master secret. It is also not possible
for an attacker to masquerade as a BS without the knowledge
of the master key (see section IV-C).
B. Identity-Based Encryption
IBE is a public-key cryptosystem that was designed to solve
some of the problems of traditional PKC algorithms. The main
idea is that known information that uniquely identies users
(e.g. email address) can be used to derive public keys. Instead
of obtaining public keys we can simply generate them and
use them to encrypt messages for given entities. The system
ensures that only the legitimate recipient can decode such a
message. As a result, keys are self-authenticated and additional
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means of public key authentication (e.g. certicates) are unnec-
essary. This system is promising especially for WSNs where
we cannot afford a conventional public key infrastructure. The
advent of PBC enabled the rst practical IBE system proposed
by Boneh and Franklin in [18]. This scheme was based on the
Weil pairing but also other types of pairings like the Tate or
´T pairing can be used. For a comprehensive mathematical
background on pairings please refer to [19].
The main advantage of IBE over traditional PKC systems
is that we do not have to store so many public keys. We can
derive them from nodes identities that are widely known in
the network. We generate a public key for a given node only
in case when we want to communicate with it for the rst
time. IBE allows us to send secure messages without any prior
interaction with a given sensor node, thus the communication
overhead is limited to minimum. IBE provides all the security
services of a traditional public key system but in a more
elegant way without the assistance from third party.
ID-based schemes assume the existence of a trusted author-
ity often called the Private Key Generator (PKG). The PKG
can use its master key to decrypt any user message. It also
has the ability to impersonate anybody in the system. For that
reason the PKG must be well protected and unconditionally
trusted by all network users. In most systems such an entity
simply does not exist. Fortunately in sensor networks the
original network deployer is a trusted authority that can play
the role of the PKG. Actually it might even be regarded as
an advantage that the deployer is in a position to monitor all
wireless trafc. The PKG can also generate a unique secret
key based on the node's identity and pre-load this information
to the node's memory before the deployment phase. At this
stage a secure channel clearly exists which allows careful
conguration of the network.
C. TinyIBE scheme
Previous proposals for using IBE in sensor networks [16],
[17] suggested the Boneh and Franklin scheme [18] for key
distribution. However this protocol is symmetric in nature
and requires expensive operations for both encryption and
decryption. In our security solution we use a simple variant of
the Sakai and Kasahara IBE scheme [20]. This IBE method is
not as well-known as that of Boneh and Franklin but it has its
advantages that perfectly t the heterogenous sensor network
setting. No pairing calculation is required for encryption and
we do not have to hash identities to elliptic curve points. These
potentially expensive operations are avoided, which makes
the whole scheme more affordable especially for the low-end
sensor nodes.
Our TinyIBE scheme can be divided into two phases each
consisting of two stages. In the pre-deployment phase PKG/BS
performs Setup and Extract operations. This is done off-line
in a secure environment:
Setup: The BS generates global system parameters that in-
clude its own master secret s 2 Z¤q , a pairing-friendly
supersingular elliptic curve E over Fq and random points
P 2 E(Fq) and Q 2 E(Fq) of order r, where Q = sP .
He generates also g = e^(P; P ) and denes two hash func-
tions H1 : f0; 1g¤ ! Z¤q and H2 : Fq ! f0; 1gn, for
some n. All nodes are pre-loaded with system parameters:
< E=Fq; Q; P; g; n;H1;H2 >.
Extract: The BS issues a unique identity IDX for each
node. The identity of every H-sensor is hashed to a value
a = H1(IDH) and a corresponding private key is generated
D = 1s+aP . Each H-sensor is also pre-loaded with a broadcast
key pair < BH ; EH > and identities of all the L-sensors in
the network (IDL).
In the above notation sP is a point multiplication operation
and e^(P; P ) is a pairing calculation. A pairing is a mapping
function between two groups of elliptic curve points. It has
the special property of bilinearity: e^(aP; bQ) = e^(P;Q)ab.
The second phase of TinyIBE scheme starts after network
deployment and consists of two main stages:
Encrypt: Every L-sensor selects its primary CH, nds the
value a = H1(IDH) for a given H-sensor and generates
random w 2 Z¤q and t 2 Z¤q . To encrypt the session key t
L-sensor creates the ciphertext C1; C2:
C1 = w(Q+ aP ) C2 = t©H2(gw)
He also includes his identity in the message.
Decrypt: After receiving the encrypted message every CH
checks the identity of the L-sensor. The decryption process
can only start in case of a positive ID check. H-sensor recovers
the session key t by using his private key D:
t = H2(e^(D;C1))© C2
The session key is used with a symmetric cipher to encrypt
the broadcast public key BH . The decryption process works
thanks to the bilinearity property of the pairing:
e^(D;C1) = e^
µ
1
s+ a
P;w(Q+ aP )
¶
=
= e^ (P; sP + aP )
w
s+a = e^ (P; P )w = gw
After the decryption step every L-sensor can use its session
key to securely communicate with a given CH. He can also
authenticate broadcasts by using the Elliptic Curve Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (ECDSA). Secure broadcasts are important
when remote network reprogramming is needed.
Figure 1 presents all the TinyIBE operations that are per-
formed after network deployment. The need for ID exchange
between nodes cannot be considered an overhead incurred by
the key distribution protocol. The majority of existing WSN
routing algorithms already requires that nodes know each other
IDs. We also assume that H-sensors are equipped with a
lot more storage space than L-sensors. This allows them to
store all the L-sensor identities without introducing too much
overhead. Additionally, ID sizes are negligible when compared
to public key and certicate sizes. It is more convenient to
maintain a list of eligible L-sensor identities rather than storing
all their public keys - like in [21].
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Fig. 1. Key distribution during the on-line phase of TinyIBE.
TinyIBE provides authenticated key distribution without
using certicates. The message encrypted for a specic CH can
only be decrypted with a correct private key D which is in the
possession of a single H-sensor and the BS. Every H-sensor
authenticates himself to any L-sensor simply by decrypting
the message and sending back data encrypted with the session
key. This prevents L-sensors from sending sensor readings
to a fake CH. Even if an adversary steals an identity of a
node or takes fake identities he still cannot act as a CH or a
BS without obtaining the proper private key D or the master
secret s. Those values are well protected and our protocol
guarantees that the master secret is not revealed even if an
attacker subverts all the nodes in the network.
It is also important to prevent fake L-sensors from taking
part in the network. H-sensor can only setup a shared key
after checking L-sensor's identity. If the ID is not on the
list CH contacts the BS to clarify if this ID is valid. In
case when two L-sensor claims the same ID, the H-sensor
informs the base station of a possible adversary in the network.
The communication between the BS and H-sensors is secured
using the Encrytp/Decrypt mechanism described earlier. Both
parties use ID-based encryption, so the communication is
authenticated in both directions. The BS can also perform
periodic checks on the lists of nodes connected to different
H-sensors. In this way the BS can detect intruders that claim
the same IDs in various parts of the network.
New node addition is easy using TinyIBE and does not
require any new keying material for existing nodes. The BS
performs the Setup and Extract operations and deploys a node
with a new ID. The H-sensor will contact the BS to validate
the new ID during the session key establishment phase. Any
external party can deploy its own L-sensors and add them
to an existing network. They only have to agree on the
identities with the BS using a secure channel. When an L-
sensor becomes an orphan he can quickly join another cluster
by encrypting a message for his secondary CH. In the case of
node compromise the BS can revoke keys by simply removing
the ID and the corresponding session key from the list that is
held by every CH. This prevents an L-sensor from establishing
a secure connection with any H-sensor of his choice.
V. TINYIBE IMPLEMENTATION
In order to check the feasibility and performance of TinyIBE
we decided to implement it on three commonly used sensor
devices. We used the Imote2 platform as an H-sensor and we
modeled L-sensors as the MICAz and Tmote Sky nodes. All
three platforms use the same CC2420 radio transceiver which
allows them to communicate within the same frequency band.
There is a clear correlation between the level of security
achieved, and the processing power required. Sensor networks
should use a minimum 80-bit security level as it is the current
standard in information security. In order to achieve a similar
security level for pairing based cryptography we need to work
with values that have more than 1024-bits. This fact makes the
pairing computation the most expensive operation in TinyIBE.
The pairing calculation in our scheme is performed only by
the more powerful H-sensors during the decryption process.
This allows us to save on code space and execution time on
low-end devices.
For the pairing implementation we chose the ´T [22]
algorithm. Our choice is motivated by our recent results [14]
that demonstrated the efciency of the ´T implementation on
embedded sensor devices. The ´T pairing is evaluated over a
binary eld F2m where m in our case denes the length of the
binary polynomial that represents eld elements. In accordance
with the required security level we chose a supersingular ellip-
tic curve y2+ y = x3+x over the binary eld F2271 with the
embedding degree k = 4. Due to space limitation we cannot
present all the details regarding the pairing implementation.
For a detailed description and parameters explanation please
refer to our recent paper [14].
Our TinyIBE scheme was implemented using the MIRACL
[23] library which provides all the necessary tools to perform
operations on elliptic curves. MIRACL is a publicly available
C library that was primary designed for desktop class com-
puters. Our implementation includes a dedicated version of
MIRACL which was specially optimised for constrained WSN
platforms. The crucial arithmetic operations used in the binary
eld arithmetic (e.g. binary polynomial multiplication) were
implemented in assembly language for all our target platforms.
A. Performance evaluation
In the rst phase of the TinyIBE scheme the PKG pre-
loads all the necessary information to sensor nodes. This is
performed off-line before the network deployment. In what
follows we focus only on the operations that are carried out by
the sensor nodes during the session key establishment phase.
The Encrypt step involves hashing and calculation of two
point multiplications. The calculation of C1 is the most expen-
sive step during the encryption process. An H-sensor public
key can be regarded as the value (Q + aP ) which is xed
for a given CH. If we assume that the encryption step will be
performed multiple times for the same H-sensor, we can cache
this value and save one point multiplication during subsequent
encryptions. However in most cases the encryption step will
be performed only once for a given CH. The calculation of
aP is a xed point multiplication with a 160-bit scalar and we
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can use precomputation methods to speed up this operation.
To compute C2 we need to perform the g value exponentiation
but this operation is negligible when compared with the C1
calculation.
The decryption step is pretty straight forward and requires
one ´T pairing calculation and one hashing to retrieve the
session key. The pairing takes as the rst parameter H-sensor's
private key which is a constant value. This xed parameter can
be exploited for precomputation that accelerates the pairing
computation at the expense of some storage overhead. In
our implementation we have put more focus on the efcient
memory utilisation and we did not use precomputation. Our
performance evaluation excludes also the ID check operation
performed by every H-sensor before the decryption step.
Table I presents the evaluation results for our TinyECC im-
plementation. All the memory and timing results were obtained
using cycle accurate simulators. We used the AVR Studio for
the Atmega128L processor (MICAz) and the IAR Embedded
Workbench in case of both MSP430 (Tmote) and Xscale
(Imote2) platforms. The energy consumption was measured
experimentally for the MICAz and Tmote Sky nodes. We used
the data sheet gures in case of the Imote2 (data not available
for 416MHz clock setting).
The encryption times for L-sensors are acceptable, given
that these operations are performed very rarely and mainly at
the beginning of the network operation. However we need to
apply methods to minimize the vulnerability to DoS attacks.
Constant requests for encryption/decryption would quickly
deplete node's energy. After the key distribution phase nodes
should use much cheaper symmetric key encryption methods.
The 32-bit Imote2 platform handles well the decryption
process and achieves best performance at maximum frequency
of 416MHz (70 decryption operations per minute). TinyIBE
is the fastest IBE scheme at the moment as we are not aware
of any other implementations on sensor nodes.
The memory footprint on both L-sensors is considerable
(especially on Tmote with its 48KB of ROM) and it is
mainly due to the large size of the ECC library. However this
includes also all the necessary library code needed to perform
the ECDSA during the secure broadcast verication. RAM
utilization may seem high for low-end devices but the memory
is reserved only for the duration of cryptographic operations.
The values showed in Table I present only the peak numbers
for stack usage during the program execution.
One of the biggest advantages of TinyIBE when compared
with the state-of-the-art is the signicant storage saving in
terms of cryptographic keys. Assume that the number of H-
sensors and L-sensors in a HSN is M and N , respectively. In
the key pre-distribution scheme proposed by Eschenauer and
Gligor (E-G [3]) the total number of pre-loaded keys in the
network is equal to: m(M + N), where each sensor is pre-
loaded with m keys. The value of m depends on the key pool
size (p) and the probability of sharing at least one key between
two nodes (ps). Du et al. proposed asymmetric pre-distribution
(A-P [8]) where H-sensors are pre-loaded with more keys (x)
than L-sensors (y). The number of pre-loaded keys can be
TABLE I
TINYIBE EVALUATION RESULTS
Platform Encryption
Time ROM RAM Energy
MicaZ (7.38MHz) 3.93s 39.6KB 2.9KB 92.67mJ
Tmote (8.19MHz) 2.62s 30.3KB 3.2KB 27.12mJ
Platform Decryption
Time ROM RAM Energy
Imote2 (13MHz) 462ms 32.87KB 4.12KB 12.12mJ
Imote2 (104MHz) 57.7ms 32.87KB 4.12KB 3.76mJ
Imote2 (416MHz) 14.4ms 32.87KB 4.12KB N/A
calculated as xM + yN where xy = m2. The ECC scheme
proposed in [21] decreases the number of necessary keys to
M(N +3)+ 2N . Our TinyIBE scheme assumes that each H-
sensor is pre-loaded with only 3 keys and the total number
of pre-loaded keys in the network (3M ) is independent of the
number of L-sensors. This feature allows our scheme to scale
gracefully with the number of nodes in the network.
Figure 2 presents the comparison between the described
schemes. The parameters were set as: M = 30, m = 100,
p = 5000, ps = 0:87, x = 500, y = 20. In all cases our
protocol requires much less storage space for the pre-loaded
keys (constant number of 90 keys) than other solutions. The
storage savings of TinyIBE are increasing drastically with the
number of L-sensors in the network.
Fig. 2. Pre-loaded key storage space.
TinyIBE introduces also signicant savings in communica-
tion overhead. In the E-G scheme each sensor broadcast the
list of identiers of keys on their key ring. When the key
pool p = 10000, m needs to be larger than 150 to achieve
a high key sharing probability of 0.9 [3]. Each key identier
requires at least 14 bits and the resulting message will have
a size of 263 bytes. In the A-P scheme [8] every L-sensor
sends a key list message to its H-sensor which includes L-
sensor's ID, the list of key IDs and node's location. This
results in a communication overhead of 94 bytes (assuming
2B for ID and 4B for location data). We used the following
parameters: x = 450, y = 50, p = 10000. Our TinyIBE
scheme requires an exchange of only one message to establish
a shared session key. The C1 value is a point on E(F2271)
which can be compressed to 34 bytes and C2 has the size of
the session key (128-bits). The resulting message has 52 bytes.
The communication overhead in TinyIBE is independent of
the network size and xed for each node pair. In case of the
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key pre-distribution schemes ([3], [8]) the overhead increases
with the number of pre-loaded keys and the key pool size. We
cannot compare our results with the ECC scheme proposed in
[21] as it does not specify the public key encryption method
used for session key distribution.
B. Security analysis
It is important to check what is the effect of an L-
sensor compromise on the rest of the network. It can be
measured by calculating the probability that an attacker can
decrypt the communication between any two nodes after
capturing c L-sensors (compromising probability). Paper [21]
presents the formula to calculate the probability that two
sensors have exactly j common keys in the E-G scheme:
p(j) =
¡
p
j
¢¡
p¡j
2(m¡j)
¢¡
2(m¡j)
m¡j
¢
=
¡
p
m
¢2, where p is the key pool
size and m is the number of pre-loaded keys in each node.
The compromising probability for the E-G scheme can be
calculated as:
C(m) =
mX
j=1
(1¡ (1¡ m
p
)c)jp(j)=
mX
j=1
p(j)
Similar formulas can be found in [8] to compute the same
probability for the A-P scheme.
In Figure 3 we compare the compromising probability of all
four schemes. We used the following parameters: p = 5000,
x = 125, y = 20 and two different values of m for the E-
G scheme. The ECC based protocol and our TinyIBE scheme
employ asymmetric cryptography primitives. After the session
key distribution phase each pair of nodes has a different shared
key. Hence, compromising c L-sensors does not affect the
security of communication among other pairs of nodes. The
compromising probability in both schemes is always equal
to zero for all c values. For the key predistribution schemes
the compromising probability increases signicantly with the
number of pre-loaded keys (m or y). Therefore the resilience
to the node compromise attack is much higher in PKC-based
protocols.
Fig. 3. The compromising probability.
VI. CONCLUSION
A common misconception is that identity-based encryption
is not a suitable security technique for sensor networks. The
argument is that IBE suffers from identity theft and replication
problems and that it is too heavyweight for sensor devices. The
results presented in this paper prove otherwise. Our security
scheme is protected against fake cluster heads and it is feasible
to implement even on the most constrained sensor nodes. The
encryption procedure takes less than four seconds on an 8-bit
MICAz platform. Identity theft and replication issues can be
addressed by simple ID check procedures. A comparison with
the state of the art shows that our TinyIBE protocol introduces
signicant savings in key storage space and communication
overhead compared to existing solutions. Additionally it pro-
vides a higher level of security and stronger resilience against
node capture attack than any key predistribution technique.
TinyIBE was designed especially for HSNs to provide a new
and simplied way for key distribution in the network. Our
work is the rst to prove that identity-based encryption is not
only feasible for HSNs but is a superior security bootstrapping
method in a heterogenous environment.
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